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Release from a hydrogen refuelling station (913)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Release from a hydrogen refuelling station

The release occurred in the hydrogen storage system of a refuelling station. In the night a leakage occurred at one of the 120 high pressure bottles (800 bar). The leakage occurred at a screwed fitting at the bottle-to-pipe connection. Three of the three sensors installed at nearby control panels detected the hydrogen (signal threshold 0. 40 % LEL) and lead to an immediate shutdown of the station. The affected high pressure bank was separated from the other banks so that a maximum of only 60 kg could be released, corresponding to the total inventory of one bank. No ignition took place. A pedestrian heard the alarm and called the police, who called the station manufacturer. In parallel, the operation team received the alarm at their remote monitor. Police called the fire brigade and installed a safer perimeters of 200 m, closing all the roads. The station manufacturer technicians were called on-site and arrived 2 hours later. They started a controlled additional de-pressurisation through a vent line bypass which brought the hydrogen to the bus dispenser vent line. After approximately 5 hours, the pressure in the affected hydrogen container was at around 1-2 bar and could be sealed again.
Event Date
February 13, 2012
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was a leakage from a connection. It particular, was known that the screwed connection at the high-pressure bottle could fall fail with a higher probability during start-up of operation and during the first 200 cycles . System design of the screwed fitting was not allowing more than 7 kg/h of flow from such a leakage. The safety measures in place worked as designed and the emergency was managed successfully, avoiding escalation. The incident highlighted nevertheless some shortcoming in mitigating measures for worse-case scenario (possible ignition of the hdyrogen) and in emergency communication (the leak was discovered by a person passing-by, there was no ad-hoc alarm aiming at warning operators). Therefore, the ROOT CAUSE could be idenfied inshortcomings of the (safety system) design.
Facility Information
Application
HRS
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
storage bottle
Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
240
Actual Pressure
80
Design Pressure
80
Location Type
Location description
DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY The storage system of the HRS consisted in 4 high pressure banks. Each bank consisted of 30 bottles at 800 bar, with a total of 60 kg/bank and a total ivnentory of 240 kg.
Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Post-event Summary

No damage.

Lessons Learned
The automatic alarm systems and safeguards worked as planned, and effectively minimised the amount of hydrogen released. However, the consequences would have been different in case of (delayed) ignition in a confined space. On top of the lessons learnt which brought to the corrective measures adopted, a general lesson learnt regarded the need to organise training for worst-case scenarios, including drill exercises .
Event Nature
Emergency Action
A pedestrian heard the alarm and called the police, who called the station manufacturer. In parallel, the operation team received the alarm at their remote monitor. Police called the fire brigade and installed a safer perimeters of 200 m, closing all the roads. The station manufacturer technicians were called on-site and arrived 2 hours later. They started a controlled additional de-pressurisation through a vent line bypass which brought the hydrogen to the bus dispenser vent line. After approximately 5 hours, the pressure in the affected hydrogen container was at around 1-2 bar and could be sealed again.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Release Amount (kg)
300.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Flame Type
References
References

Investigation report of the related project (not publicly available)

The event is reported and analysed, with interesting assumptions and discussion, by: Ayi et al, Is hydrogen ignition data from literature practically observed?, 89 (2024) 746-759 https://doi. org/10. 1016/j. ijhydene. 2024. 09. 269 (accessed January 2025)

Also in H2TOOLS https://h2tools. org/lessons/hydrogen-cylinder-leak-fueling-station (accessed Sept 2025)