Release from a hydrogen refuelling station
The release occurred in the hydrogen storage system of a refuelling station. In the night a leakage occurred at one of the 120 high pressure bottles (800 bar). The leakage occurred at a screwed fitting at the bottle-to-pipe connection. Three of the three sensors installed at nearby control panels detected the hydrogen (signal threshold 0. 40 % LEL) and lead to an immediate shutdown of the station. The affected high pressure bank was separated from the other banks so that a maximum of only 60 kg could be released, corresponding to the total inventory of one bank. No ignition took place. A pedestrian heard the alarm and called the police, who called the station manufacturer. In parallel, the operation team received the alarm at their remote monitor. Police called the fire brigade and installed a safer perimeters of 200 m, closing all the roads. The station manufacturer technicians were called on-site and arrived 2 hours later. They started a controlled additional de-pressurisation through a vent line bypass which brought the hydrogen to the bus dispenser vent line. After approximately 5 hours, the pressure in the affected hydrogen container was at around 1-2 bar and could be sealed again.
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was a leakage from a connection. It particular, was known that the screwed connection at the high-pressure bottle could fall fail with a higher probability during start-up of operation and during the first 200 cycles . System design of the screwed fitting was not allowing more than 7 kg/h of flow from such a leakage. The safety measures in place worked as designed and the emergency was managed successfully, avoiding escalation. The incident highlighted nevertheless some shortcoming in mitigating measures for worse-case scenario (possible ignition of the hdyrogen) and in emergency communication (the leak was discovered by a person passing-by, there was no ad-hoc alarm aiming at warning operators). Therefore, the ROOT CAUSE could be idenfied inshortcomings of the (safety system) design.
