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Release of hydrogen in a gas cabinet of a laboratory (1238)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Release of hydrogen in a gas cabinet of a laboratory

The event occurred in a research laboratory on renewable energies and decarbonisation. The Lab Manager had swapped a hydrogen cylinder, together with the delivery personnel. They secured the cylinder, located in a fire-proof cabinet, and performed a leak test by means of the soapy water method, after which the the gas cabinet and gas room were closed. Less than 2 min later, a high-level alarm (10% or over of the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) activated, mandating the evacuation of the personnel. The alarm was issued by the explosive gas sensor in the hydrogen cabinet, measuring 37% of the LEL of hydrogen. The Lab Manager could monitor the sensor reading remotely; when he noticed that the hydrogen concentration was not increasing, s/he eliminated any personal item which could provide a source of ignition and re-entered the gas room and sealed the hydrogen cylinder. The gas rapidly dissipated, and 40 minutes after the alarm personnel was allowed to re-enter the building.

Event Date
January 24, 2019
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIATING CAUSE leak was caused by the difficulty to tighten the connection, due to the use of steel instead of brass in the cylinder connector. The Lab manager and the assisting personnel had to use abnormal force. The leak was probably too small to show bubbles during the soapy water test. A prolonged soap test would have probably been able to detect the small leak. This would have avoided the need to re-enter the room and the cabinet, which was containing more hydrogen than just after the installation of the cylinder. The ROOT CAUSE was a shortcoming in the procedure related to the installation of the cylinder and the leak test. A CONTRIBUTING CAUSE could be identified in the failure to realise the increasing difficulty of the tightening, which could bring to some leak, and to notify it timely to management.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Renewable energy laboratory
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

nothing

Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
20
Design Pressure
20
Location Type
Location description

DESCRIPTION OF THE SAFETY SYSTEM OF THE LABORATORY The laboratory had a safety system based on 111 gas detectors, all of which serviced quarterly, and all of which able to trigger the automatic closing of all gas lines via solenoid valves. A control panel located outside of the laboratory allowed the gas levels of any sensor to be monitored remotely. Alarm conditions were immediately highlighted, making easier the immediate identification of deviation from normal conditions. Gas cylinders were stored in two gas manifold rooms equipped with 4-hour fire rated doors . The rooms were not accessible to general staff. Cylinders of flammable, explosive and oxidizing gases were kept in explosion-resistant and fire-proof cabinets. The gases were piped through flashback resistors and coaxial cables able to detect automatically damages or leaks, and to trigger the closing of the solenoid valves.

Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Property Loss (onsite)

0

Post-event Summary

No damage

Lessons Learned

The laboratory affected by this event had a well-designed safety system. The safety system worked as designed, and it was possible to adopt mitigating measures which avoided escalation. Nevertheless, the system showed some vulnerability to leaks located before the automatic supply shutdown system, in combination with the increasing difficulty in executing the tightening procedure. Moreover, the procedure / instructions did not consider a scenario of a slowly developing leak. This case highlights how challenging is to perform an effective safety design of a complex set of activities and operations, by considering all possible scenarios. The case also reveals the importance of a timey feedback from operations, provided by workers made aware and trained on hazards and risks. The difficult of the tightening should have been reported well before the occurrence of this event, and this feedback could have brought to an earlier improvement of the connection. On thepersistent shortcoming of the soap test, see for exampe the old eventr HIAD_038.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

The high-level alarm on 10% LEL triggered an automatic evacuation of the personnel. The leak could not be stopped by the automatic shutdown od he hydrogen supply system, because it occurred at the hydrogen cylinder. Therefore, the Lab Manager had to perform a in situ manual operation.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

H. Schmidt, " Anatomy of an incident: A hydrogen gas leak showcases the need for antifragile safety systems" Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, 26 (2019) 36-39, doi/10. 1016/j. jchas. 2019. 05. 005