Skip to main content

Release and ignition when starting operation of a new hydrogen line (154)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Release and ignition when starting operation of a new hydrogen line

[Note of HIAD event validator: the description of this incident presents aspects which hinder the full understanding of the event sequence: for example, the PHMSA report uses the term ‘purge’ to describe the injection of hydrogen into a new pipeline. This is not the common use of the verb purge. It is also unclear how the system was built, how the two lines were connected with each-others and with the vent system. The incident is nevertheless validated because is one of the scarce cases related to incident in pipelines for transport of hydrogen]. The operators involved had begun work to purge a new hydrogen 6" line into service. The required pre-work had been completed, and one operator was at the valve station preparing to slowly let hydrogen into the line, from an adjacent 8" line, which was already in service. The second operator was at the valve station vent, to monitor purge gas flow and purity. The second operator mistakenly thought that the purge had already started, and he thought that there was insufficient purge flow at the vent. He decided to open the isolation valve to the pressurized 8" line at his end. By opening the valve, he caused a high-volume flow of hydrogen through the adjacent vent pipe, which ignited. The second operator received burns to his hands and face. A company truck was destroyed and other vehicles were damaged.

Event Date
October 20, 2006
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

INITIATING CAUSE is the erroneous injection of hydrogen high flow into the vent pipe The ROOT CAUSE relates to the wrong execution of a procedure, and probably also to lack of clarity of it.

Facility Information
Application
pipeline
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

pipeline, vent

Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
2
Design Pressure
10
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The operation which brought to the incident consisted in preparing a new pipeline for its first operation.

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
1
Number of Fatalities
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

110000

Post-event Summary

An employee received burns to hands and face. A company truck was destroyed and other vehicles were damaged.

Lessons Learned

In this accident, two employees at different location were supposed to execute a series of operation depending of each-others. It went wrong because of the assumption of one of the two, on an action taken by the other. The incident has been attributed to a failure to follow the procedure. However, this error could have been minimise by: (1) Ensuring the availability of proper communication means. (2) Introduce automatic safeguards, so that the one employee could not process at a next step without cling the previous step.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

no evacuation. The area was declared safe after 1/2 hour

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: https://www. phmsa. dot. gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/distribution-transmission-gathering-lng-and-liquid-accident-and-incident-data (accessed September 2024)