Release and ignition when starting operation of a new hydrogen line
[Note of HIAD event validator: the description of this incident presents aspects which hinder the full understanding of the event sequence: for example, the PHMSA report uses the term ‘purge’ to describe the injection of hydrogen into a new pipeline. This is not the common use of the verb purge. It is also unclear how the system was built, how the two lines were connected with each-others and with the vent system. The incident is nevertheless validated because is one of the scarce cases related to incident in pipelines for transport of hydrogen]. The operators involved had begun work to purge a new hydrogen 6" line into service. The required pre-work had been completed, and one operator was at the valve station preparing to slowly let hydrogen into the line, from an adjacent 8" line, which was already in service. The second operator was at the valve station vent, to monitor purge gas flow and purity. The second operator mistakenly thought that the purge had already started, and he thought that there was insufficient purge flow at the vent. He decided to open the isolation valve to the pressurized 8" line at his end. By opening the valve, he caused a high-volume flow of hydrogen through the adjacent vent pipe, which ignited. The second operator received burns to his hands and face. A company truck was destroyed and other vehicles were damaged.

INITIATING CAUSE is the erroneous injection of hydrogen high flow into the vent pipe The ROOT CAUSE relates to the wrong execution of a procedure, and probably also to lack of clarity of it.