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Over-pressurisation of a LH2 tanker (374)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Over-pressurisation of a LH2 tanker

A liquid hydrogen tanker was loaded at the home base and dispatched to a customer (approximately 790 km). The internal vessel pressure after filling was 8 psig (1. 4 bara). During transit, the pressure remained stable at 8 psig until a safety check after 8 hours indicated a pressure of 17 psig (2. 2 bara). The drivers received instructions from their home terminal to switch to the 50 psi (4. 5 bara) safety relief valve. The next safety check after additional 3. 5 hours revealed a pressure rise to 30 psig (3. 1 bara). The drivers were instructed to move to a safe, isolated area to conduct a controlled venting. After venting down to 18 psig, the drivers continued transit to the customer site without further blow down.

Event Date
August 18, 1993
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments

The INITIATING CAUSE of the event was the increase of the internal pressure of the LH2 tank. The report does not give insights on root causes. It could have been caused ((1) by over-pressurisation (overload) during filling at the base terminal, or (2) by a reduction of the thermal insulation capacity of the tank walls. It could also (3) have been integral part of the foreseen safety measures to be undertaken to counterbalance boil-off during a long travel. Therefore, ROOT CAUSE is unknown.

Facility Information
Application
LH2 tanker
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

LH2 tank overpressure

Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
0
Design Pressure
0
Location Type
Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

25

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

A negligible amount of hydrogen was released, with a loos of only 25 US dollars

Event Nature
Emergency Action

A manual hydrogen vent was executed to reduce (in jargon 'to stabilise") the vapour pressure inside the LH2 tank. The drivers could handle the emergency alone.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

Report I-1993081243 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: https://portal. phmsa. dot. gov/analytics/saw. dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2Fshared%2FPublic%20Website%20Pages%2F_portal%2FHazmat%20Incident%20Report%20Search (accessed September 2024)