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Over-pressurisation of a LH2 tanker (373)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Over-pressurisation of a LH2 tanker

An empty liquid Hydrogen tanker was returning to the base terminal from a delivery at a space centre. At the departure, the internal vessel pressure was 8 psig. At the first safety check, the pressure had raised to 20 psig. At the second safety check (after approximately 240 miles), the pressure had risen to 42 psig. At this moment, the drivers received instruction to move the vehicle to a safe location and perform a controlled venting to reduce the pressure to 30 psig. The pressure remained at an acceptable level for the remainder of the trip. An inspection of the unit revealed that the rise in pressure was due to moisture being released into the annular space from internal getters. The trailer was put out of service and corrective maintenance was performed to remove all excess moisture from the annular space.

Event Date
January 18, 1994
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIAL CAUSE was the unexpected increase of the internal pressure of the liquid hydrogen vessel after the start of the travel. This event could be classified as a near miss, because the hydrogen released to the environment was part of mitigating measures foreseen by the procedure. Nevertheless, it is classified as an incident because the ROOT CAUSE was identified in the loss of thermal isolation capacity of the vacuum annular layer, due to condensation of moisture present in the vacuum system itself (getters).

Facility Information
Application
LH2 tanker
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

LH2 tank overpressure

Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
3880
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The tanker was empty, having just delivered hydrogen to a customer site. Only gaseous hydrogen, no LH2 was left.

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

200

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

5. 5 kg of hydrogen were released.

Lessons Learned

Presence of condensed phase in the annular vacuum space of a cryogenic tank is something that was not considered possible, and that has been found out by the practice. It is not known if and witch remedial measures were taken.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

A manual hydrogen vent was executed to reduce (in jargon 'to stabilise") the vapour pressure inside the LH2 tank. The drivers could handle the emergency alone.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

Report I-1994021002 of the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration PHMSA: https://portal. phmsa. dot. gov/analytics/saw. dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2Fshared%2FPublic%20Website%20Pages%2F_portal%2FHazmat%20Incident%20Report%20Search (accessed September 2024)