These two incidents are almost a near-miss: the detection alarm was set at a very low concentration of hydrogen in air (in the range of 120 to 160 ppm). Since operations were stopped immediately after, it can be assumed that hydrogen amount released was very low and by far below the threshold necessary to form an explosive mixture in the compressor room. HIAD classifies this type of leaks as incident, because (I) every emission of hydrogen is unwanted event, and (ii) it implies stop of operation, with consequent financial losses, including the costs of investigations. Moreover, the events provided important considerations: (1) The General High-Pressure Gas Safety Regulations require alarms set at 10,000 ppm or less. Alarms for gas leak detection set at less than 10,000 ppm of hydrogen in air meet this legal requirement. The KHK notes in its report (see References) that alarm settings for equipment installed at compressed hydrogen fuelling stations vary among operators. Since a technical basis to identify a leak event as an incident is missing, and if an event is classified as (high-pressure) incident or not depends only on administrative consideration. It can be added, that choice of a effective alarm able to prevent escalation depends on many factors, not only intrinsic to the equipment, such as the type and number of detectors, their location, the place where the equipment are installed, the ventilation available, other equipment nearby, etc. This explain why it is challenging to agree on a general alarm setting. (2) The sealing materials used in compressed hydrogen fuelling stations were still under development in the period in which these leaks occurred, and are still it now, some years later. Manufacturers must be aware of this when designing and manufacturing, and users must be aware of this when operating and managing the equipment. Therefore, efforts must be made to constantly obtain and utilize the latest information. Information on accidents and malfunctions should be shared widely with those involved in compressed hydrogen fuelling stations, not just inside the affected plant operator, and should be used to contribute to accident prevention. (3) Incidents and malfunctions that occur at compressed hydrogen stations often involve causes that cannot be easily solved technically. As a result, it may not be possible to immediately implement permanent measures, and it may take time to verify whether the permanent measures being considered are effective. Therefore, until permanent measures can be implemented, it is important that manufacturers and users work together to implement on-site temporary measures such as strengthening monitoring systems.
The INITIATING CAUSE was in both cases the loos of confinement caused by the degradation of O-rings located in the head of the compressor heads. The compressor manufacturer recommended that the compressor be disassembled, inspected, and opened for maintenance after three years or after 1,000 operation hours after the completion of the test run. The first O-ring which leaked had not yet reached the end of the prescribed lifetime. It was found twisted, but the twist disappeared with time. The investigator concluded that the pressure cycles occurring in the compressor head (from 45 to 82 MPa) were responsible for the twist. The second O-ring which leaked had scratches on the surface, no cracks or twists. This O-ring had arrived almost at the end of its lifetime and had never been replaced since installation. It is probable that the scratches were the consequences of a too long service life. The ROOT CAUSE was in first instance the use of not-optimal materials for the harsh condition experienced in the compressor heads, worsened by the fact that the inspection and maintenance should have been able to detect a deviation from the original state of the rings.