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Leak from a valve in a HRS (1195)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Leak from a valve in a HRS

A leak occurred at the compression unit of the refuelling station. The employees had just initiated the normal procedure of starting up the hydrogen production equipment, and opened the three shut-off valves, one for each of the three storage vessels. At this point, the gas leak detection system located above the valve unit room detected a hydrogen concentration of 1 vol% or more and issued a high-level alarm. This triggered the activation of the safety devices which automatically shut down the hydrogen production equipment and cutting off the power supply to the compressed hydrogen station. The leak location was identified on one of the three a shut-off valve.

Event Date
December 26, 2016
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIATING CAUSE of the leak was the deterioration of a rubber o-ring. The investigation revealed that the hydrogen was leaking from the O-ring used in the maintenance plug of the shutoff valve. The O-ring was degraded due to the high temperature of the hydrogen passing through the shutoff valve, 40°C higher than the outside temperature. (1) The O-ring used in the maintenance plug of the shutoff valve was an O-ring developed for low-temperature, high-pressure hydrogen, intended for pre-cooling. The high-temperature side was designed to withstand temperatures of 85°C or less. (2) Tests revealed that when the O-ring is exposed to high-pressure hydrogen at room temperature for a long period of time, the plasticizer components added to the ring are released, causing the ring to lose its elasticity and not return to its original shape. (3) Similar hydrogen leaks had occurred at nearly 20 other hydrogen filling stations, and the O-ring was a regular replacement item, but this information was not communicated to the hydrogen filling station installers and operators. As a result, it is believed that continued use of the ring led to the hydrogen leak. The ROOT CAUSE was a material design shortcoming, related to the wrong choice of the material of the O-ring for the operative vonitions of the valve.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
70 MPa HRS
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

O-ring, shut-off valve

Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description

DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY The HRS was a 70MPa refuelling station with a high-pressure gas production capacity: 29. 9m3/day. A non-further specified hydrogen generator was connected in parallel to three storage vessels via shut-off valves. Three additonal shut-off valves, one for each of the three vessels,were located between the vessels and the dispenser. Although the scheme provided by the KHK reprot does not show a compressor, it coudkl be assumed that a comressor was isnalled betwee nthe production unit and the valve (unless the the production unit was able to deliver high-pressure hydrogen to the vessels).

Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The HRS was starting the hydrogen production, according to a standard procedure.

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Property Loss (onsite)

0

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

This is case at the border between a minor incident and a near miss. The safety systems in place worked as designed with no consequence to human or installation, except the time lost during the shut-down and the neeed to change the design.

Lessons Learned

This is a case at the border between a minor incident and a near miss. The safety systems in place worked as designed with no consequence to human or installation, except the time lost during the shut-down and the investigation. In the period when this event occurred, many high-pressure gas equipment used at hydrogen refuelling stations were newly developed and had little performance and failure track record. This applies as well to consumables such as O-rings. Therefore, it was (an still is) critical that hydrogen station operators, installation engineers and high-pressure gas equipment manufacturers establish a system for sharing information about mishaps and other problems.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

The safety systems in place worked as designed with no consequence to human or installation

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

KHK accidentl database, incident 2016-1066: https://www. khk. or. jp/public_information/incident_investigation/hpg_incident/gen_lp. html (accessed august 2024)

English translated version (by Google)