Flash fire on a vessel containing rest of process gases
This incident occurred a product purge vessel flange during planned maintenance activities on a chemical plant. The vessel had the function to collect unreacted gases from a polyethylene production unit, via a flare system. Worked had unsuccessfully tried to open the vessel with the prescribed low energy tools, therefore a special permission to operate grinder was given, based on the assumption that the vessel was isolated from the flair and was not containing combustible gases. During the grinding works, a flash fire was released from a vessel flange, which seriously injured four contract workers. The reason of the fire was the presence of a flammable atmosphere in the vessel, involving air and approximately 10 pounds of a mixture of hydrogen, methane, ethane, ethylene, isopentane, hexane, hexene, and nitrogen. Despite the presence of a series of valves to isolate the vessel from the flare system, only one valve was closed at the time of the incident. This valve did not fully prevent flammable gas from flowing from the flare system into the vessel.

The INITIATING CAUSE of the flash fire was hot work performed to open the pressure vessel containing a flammable atmosphere. The ROOT CAUSE was an ineffective procedure based only on the assumption that one single isolation valve was enough to prevent flammables from entering the vessel during maintenance work. The lack of gas testing of vessel gas composition was a critical shortcoming.