Fire in a refinery
This incident occurred at a reactor for the isomerization of wax in a lube oil plant. The high-pressure reactor ruptured during a catalyst activation operation. A hot (400 C) gaseous stream of hydrogen (70%) and light hydrocarbons (30%) was released and spontaneously ignited. The unit was immediately shutdown and depressurised. The fire was limited to the vicinity of the ruptured reactor and was extinguished within twenty minutes by onsite emergency services. There were no injuries but damage to equipment included the reactor and some piping, instrumentation and air-fin heat exchangers on an adjacent structure. An investigation identified the following series of events preparing the failure of the reactor. (1) The process consisted in a metal reduction operation in presence of hydrogen and a catalyst. Before the reaction could take place, it was necessary to activate the fresh catalyst. The target activation temperature was higher than the normal operating range of 300-380 degrees C, but still within the reactor design temperature. Since the reactor was a stacked bed reactor with entry at the top, the hydrogen rich gas had to pass over the fresh catalyst and then over the older catalyst beds. (2) The gas was initially warmed-up via a furnace and passed through the reactor. As the inlet bed temperature target was approached, the furnace coil outlet temperature overshot its set point and three out of the four top bed temperature instruments went out of range, with the temperature at the bottom of that bed exceeding the vessel design temperature. (3) In response, furnace firing was reduced and quench gas flows were increased to the reactor. Temperature control was poor as the furnace was tuned for normal process liquid/gas operation rather than gas-only activation. Two hours into the activation, the top bed temperatures had steadied out around the target activation temperature but the bottom temperature reading in that bed and all eight of the temperature readings in the two catalyst beds below remained offscale, beyond the design temperature of the reactor. (4) The activation step was completed two hours later and the reactor cooled down. Three hours into the cool down phase, the reactor, which had a diameter of one metre and a wall thickness of 50 mm, ruptured at the base of the middle catalyst bed.
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was the release of a flammable mixture due to the rupture of the reactor, probably from thermo-mechanical stresses induced by too hight temperatures experienced. This was only the second time that the activation had been performed on this catalyst system. The actual processes occurring within the reactor were not fully understood. The reactor was operated for ours outside the design specification and there were no high-temperature automatic shutdown systems. Cosidering this and the fact that the furnace was tuned for normal process liquid/gas operation rather than gas-only activation, the job preparation should have been re-thought and re-designed. The ROOT CAUSE can be attributed to lack of management intervention required by the change of the process, as well as failure in reacting to the deviation from the normal process values. The temperature readings were intentionally disregarded or misinterpreted. The operational procedures and training of managers, engineers and operators were inadequate. (1) Failure to understand the processes occurring in the reactor and the effect of an increase in temperature on the rate of exothermic reactions. (2) Inadequate cooling facilities. (3) An inadequate control system and the absence of a high temperature trip device. (4) Inadequate operational procedures and training of managers, engineers and operators.
