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Fire in a process reactor of a metallurgical plant (925)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire in a process reactor of a metallurgical plant

The event occurred in fire in a classified-Seveso metallurgical plant. A fire initiated in a acid treatment reactor of a workshop handling cementation of indium . Under normal conditions, the reaction of the process in the tank releases hydrogen. The fire propagated to the plastic components above the tank, causing black smoke released inside the workshop. The origin of the fire were sparks produced by the grinding of metal gratings overhanging the tank. According to the ARIA report (see references), they must have come into contact with the gaseous atmosphere of the tank through the throughput of the stirring shaft. The grinding work had been allowed by an intervention permit and was equipped with protections designed to limit the dispersion of sparks.
Event Date
January 16, 2015
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments
INITIATING CAUSE were the sparks generated by grinding, supposed to enter the tank containing hydrogen as reaction product. The ROOT CAUSE is not reproted, but it could be related to the use of inadequate measures for avoiding ignition sources inside the tank during maintenance works.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Special metals processing
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
acid metallurgical treatment reactor
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
Maintenance works were executed on top of the reactor tank
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Lessons Learned
The fact that the inspection required for the future the systematic implementation of thermal camera during firefighting is due to the fact that during the emergency actions, the fire regained strength due to undetected hot spots. The ARIA report (see references) does not report any lesson learnt. Nevertheless, it may be reasonably assumed that the event would profit from improved maintenance procedure, such as purging of the tank and monitoring hydrogen concentrations in the gaseous phase of tank.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
The second responders extinguished the fire after 15 minutes using foamers and cooled the installations. The fire resumed after a few minutes, as some undetected hot spots had remained. The further use of foamers allowed its final extinguishment.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Event description in the French database ARIA https://www. aria. developpement-durable. gouv. fr/accident/46155/ (accessed September 2020)