Fire on a hydro-desulphurisation column
The incident occurred in the hydrogen sulphide absorption tower of the kerosene desulphurisation unit of a refinery. The hydrogen leaked from the liquid level gauge and ignited causing a fire. The leak was due to a bolt which came loose and to a wrong insertion of the packing that seals the glass of the liquid level gauge and the flange of the main body. Sequence of events: The day before the leakage, the unit had been shut down in accordance with the scheduled repair plan. Only the hydrogen sulphide absorption tower affected continued to operate. On the day of the incident, around 12:55, a construction worker who was nearby witnessed the leak by hearing a loud "bang" and notified the incident. The plant supervisor inspected the scene and ordered an emergency stop. 13:01, an emergency stop operation was started in the instrument room. 13:10 The affected tower could be disconnected from other units and the emergency release valve was opened to reduce the tower pressure from 50 bar to 1. 5 bar. After decompression, cooling water was sprinkled and water was injected into the tower to raise the liquid level above the leak point. 13:25 The fire was extinguished.

The INITIATING CAUSE of the leak was a wrongly assembled liquid level gauge. The packing that seals the glass of the Klinger liquid level gauge to the main body was over tightened, resulting in deterioration. Because of this, during the two years of operation, a bolt without spring washer became loose, causing the oteh bolts to become overloaded. Probably the packing could not withstand the internal pressure and broke at a bolt next to the loosened one, causing the process gas to erupt. The ignition was attributed to static electricity generated during hydrogen ejection. Therefore, the ROOT CAUSE could be attributed to wrong installation and lack of quality control by the manufacturer of the gauge. A factor could also be attributed to shortcoming in the inspection effectiveness of the plant operator. Morevoer, the absence of automatically shut-off valves to stop the flow in the event of a large gas leak hints atthe lack of a risk assessment related to the specific installation.