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Fire at a generator of a power plant (493)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire at a generator of a power plant

SYNOPTICs The loss of the hydrogen side sealing oil pump and other problems in the sealing oil system resulted in the coolant hydrogen leaking from the generator. The hydrogen leaked for several minutes before it ignited and exploded. A fire followed the large explosion, which burned for five to eight minutes. DETAILES SERIES OF EVENTS The plant was operating at 92% power when a ground fault on a land steam exhauster caused the supply breaker to a motor control centre (MCC) to trip. This supply breaker could not be reclosed. The loss of the MCC resulted in a loss of the hydrogen side seal oil pump for the main generator that is powered from that MCC. Nevertheless, the plant continued operation as the licensee procedures and technical manual of the turbine-generator manufacturer allowed full-load operation with the hydrogen side seal oil pump shut down. When operators initiated implementation of a procedure to restore the seal oil system, a small hydrogen explosion occurred and a reactor power reduction was initiated. Shortly thereafter, with the plant at 85% power, a large explosion and fire occurred and the turbine was immediately tripped. Some of the equipment damaged during the fire and explosion caused several grounds in the i nth electrical power system, resulting in voltage degradation which hindered the fighting of the emergency.
Event Date
March 19, 1984
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
INITIATING CAUSE The loss of the pump serving the hydrogen side seal oil was at the basis of the incidents. ROOT CAUSE The fact that the operation allowed even without the seal oil pump was probably a contributing or root cause, because is the responsible of hydrogen leak and accumulation before ignition. The fighting of the emergency resulted in additional deficiencies, probably due to loss of voltage capacity because of the fire. This suggests design or management root causes.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Nuclear power plant
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
steam exhauster, turbine-compressor system
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The plant was operating at 92% power when a ground fault on a land steam exhauster caused the supply breaker to a motor control centre (MCC) to trip. This supply breaker could not be reclosed. The loss of the MCC resulted in a loss of the hydrogen side seal oil pump for the main generator that is powered from that MCC. The plant continued operation as the licensee procedures and technical manual of the turbine-generator manufacturer (Westinghouse) allow full-load operation with the hydrogen side seal oil pump shut down.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Post-event Summary

Following the large explosion, the fire burned for several minutes and was extinguished by the CO2 system. The explosion resulted in the generator housing lower skirts being thrown into some neighbouring equipment. The missiles also broke two large hand wheels for valves and damaged some small test valves and non-safety-related level instruments.

Lessons Learned
The national nuclear authority issued suggestions but no legal requirements. The suggestions regarded the need to consider and adopt measure regarding the potentially severe problems caused by failure of non-nuclear instrumentation power supplies at reactor facilities of the same type as the one affected. For a generic , see HIAD ID = 042
Event Nature
Emergency Action
0. Following shut down of the hydrogen side seal oil pump, operators initiated a procedure to restore the seal oil system. There is a time correlation between this event and the first small hydrogen explosion. 1. The reactor was automatically tripped by the recently installed anticipatory trip circuit. 2. Following the large explosion, the fire burned for several minutes and was extinguished by the CO2 system 3. Shortly after the reactor trip, the operators proceeded to start auxiliary boilers to provide for the auxiliary steam loads. The small boiler was successfully fired. When the control power for the big boiler was turned on, in preparation for its start, the small boiler tripped and control power to both boilers was lost.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Flame Type
References
References

US. NRC Information Notice No. 84-80: Plant Transients Induced by Failure of Non-Nuclear Instrumentation Power

This event is listed in From T. VIROLAINEN, J. MARTTILA, H. AULAMO, "TURRBINE GENERATORS AT VVER-440 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS”, in "Upgrading of fire safety in nuclear power plants", IAEA-TECDOC-1014, Proceedings of an International Symposium, Vienna (Austria), 18-21 November 1997 https://www. iaea. org/publications/5310/upgrading-of-fire-safety-in-nuclear-power-plants (accessed July 2024)