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Fire at a chlorine electrolyser (180)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire at a chlorine electrolyser

Two successive fires broke out in an interval of few minutes in four cells in the electrolysis room of a chlorine production plant. The technicians brought the fire under control using the fire-fighting equipment located nearby. In both cases presence of hydrogen, ignited by a short circuit spark, was responsible for the two accidents. Case (1): the hydrogen leaked when a rubber-plastic pipe was manually disconnected from a hydrogen trap. Despite the fact that that this operation is covered by a specific procedure, it was performed when hydrogen quality was not good enough to be collected. Case (2): the hydrogen leaked when a sleeve failed locally by corrosion.
Event Date
June 26, 2003
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The two sub-events have the same INITATING CAUSE, a hydrogen fires during operation. The two fires have different two ROOT CAUSES. In case (1) was a wrong operation (in presence of a formal procedure). In case (2) it was probably a design or inspection shortcoming (corrosion). The following investigation identified FACTORS related to design The IGNITION SOURCE of the released hydrogen was an electrical spark caused by a short-circuit. Different potential causes of the short-circuit were identified: - the compatibility of insulating material has not been checked - lack of wet-proofing between anode and cathode - not enough distance between anode and hydrogen pipe due to a modification of the connection and a miss-alignment of the cells
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Chlorine production
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
Electrolyser's cells, sleeve, pipe
Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
0
Design Pressure
0
Location Type
Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Property Loss (onsite)

0

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

In both cases, the fire must have been of a very low itnensinty, and rhe technicians brought it under control using the fire-fighting equipment located nearby.

Lessons Learned
A lack of information on the system, components and the operations hinder the understanding of this event. Which electrolysis technology was used? What does it mean that "Too low hydrogen quality" was the reason for the first fire? Which was the operation foreseen on the hydrogen trap? Where was the failed sleeve located? Was the system operating normally or was it under maintenance? The only possible general lesson emerging is the need for a quality check and control when reporting an incident. If the original event description provided by an operator or personnel is badly written, all the following up reporting cannot be better. Too often, the direct involved reporting person insider terms and assume the context known to the reader. Part of the safety training of personnel should focus on the important of a well written Operative Incident Report.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
The two release of hydrogen ignited within a couple of minutes. The fire was extinguished by the operators.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Event description in the French database ARIA https://www. aria. developpement-durable. gouv. fr/accident/25112/ (accessed January 2023)