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Failure of a high pressure synthesis feed pipe in an ammonia plant. (863)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Failure of a high pressure synthesis feed pipe in an ammonia plant.

The failure of a high pressure hydrogen-based synthetic gas feed line to the ammonia converter produced a sudden explosion followed by a severe fire. One of the operators was fatally injured. The failure of the feed line was characterized by a sudden rupture. There was no leakage prior to rupture. Portions of the piping shattered in a brittle fracture, which was produced due to a severe hydrogen attack. Extensive blisters were observed on the inside surface which failed. The initial crack probably originated at one of two small nozzles provided for temperature measurements. These small nozzles acted as stress raisers.
Event Date
December 9, 1984
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was failure of a high pressure synthesis pipe due to internal hydrogen attack, which induced steel decarbonisation and brittle fracture. Probably the possibility of the hydrogen attack was not taken into consideration in the design and the maintenance phases.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Ammonia production
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
syngas pipeline, ammonia reactor
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPONENT The failed pipe had a diameter of 323. 9 mm and a wall thickness of 36 mm .
Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
1
Number of Fatalities
0
Lessons Learned
This is a case of road crash involving a liquid hydrogen carrier without release, despite its roll-over. The protective structure designed for avoiding damage to the pressure control system worked as expected. Because of the long-term aspects of a failure of the type of this event, in 1986 Prescott et al. (see references) was recommending all operators of ammonia plants to check the alloy content of components and welds, and to check alloys operating limits for in hydrogen service to avoid decarburization and cracking.
Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
syngas
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Prescott et al. , "Failure of High Pressure Synthesis Pipe", Plant/Operations Process, Vol. 5 (1986), No. 3, pp. 155-l59