Explosion of a hydrogen/oil mixture in a refinery
The event started at the effluent pipe of one of the hydro-cracking reactors, which broke and released a mixture of hydrogen, light gases (methane, butane), light gasoline; heavy gasoline; gas oil. The mixture instantly ignited upon contact with air, causing an explosion and fire. The explosion caused one fatality a several injuriesThe pipe ruptured due to excessively high temperature, in excess of 14000 F (760 C). This high operating temperature was initiated by a temperature excursion in one of the a catalyst beds of the reactor which raised the temperature in the reactor effluent pipe. The runaway event was a consequence of the failure of initiating the shut down procedure which is foreseen by operating procedures in case the reactor temperatures exceeded the 800 F temperature limit (425 C). This procedure foresaw the full depressurisation of the reactor. The cause of the temperature excursion was probably related to poor flow and non-uniform heat distribution.
Event Date
January 27, 1997
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
According to the EPA report (see references), the INITIATING CAUSE was of the rupture of the effluent pipe due to excessively high temperature. Contributing cause was the fact that the operators did not activate the emergency shutdown procedure because they were confused about whether a temperature excursion was actually occurring (difficult interpretation of the signals). The investigators identified the following ROOT and CONTRIBUTING CAUSES: (1) The conditions to support employees to operate the reactors in a safe manner inadequate. (2) Human factors poorly considered in the design and operation of the reactor temperature monitoring system. (3) Supervisory management inadequate. (4) Operational readiness and maintenance inadequate. (5) Operator training and support inadequate. (6) Procedures outdated and incomplete. (7) Inadequacy of the process hazard analysis (8) Barriers against hazardous work conditions inadequate.
