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Explosion at a hydrogen production unit (15)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion at a hydrogen production unit

The explosion occurred at the hydrogen producing unit of a refinery. A solution of potassium carbonate was being drawn off from an absorption tower to a temporary storage tank for a turnaround shutdown maintenance. The tank exploded, due to backflow of hydrogen into the tank. The level of the solution in the tower was not checked. When a water solution in an absorption tower for carbonic acid gas is drawn off, the water level of the solution drops. This drop was ignored and the pump cavitated. Since the pump and a transfer valve had not been shut down, hydrogen in the absorption tower flowed into the tank. The hydrogen ignited in the tank, probably due to spark at the wall surface or the solution surface. The force of the flow blew off scales, coarse particulates, and solution in the tank. SEQUENCE On May 23rd , 1996: operation was stopped. 7:05 on 24th; the shift changed 7:30; a meeting about turnaround shutdown maintenance was held. About 8:00; the meeting finished and operators in charge of solution draw-off read out and collated an operation manual for twenty minutes. About 8:10; a potassium carbonate water solution started to be drawn off into an inventory tank. As a pump cavitation occurred, a delivery valve was adjusted, but the pump continued to cavitate, so the pump was stopped and draw-off work was also suspended. About 8:15; the tank exploded. Its roof was scattered around the sites of neighbouring offices, and office buildings and vehicles were damaged by a blast.
Event Date
May 24, 1996
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was the explosion of a tank due presence of a hydrogen explosive atmosphere. The ROOT CAUSE was a series of wrong operations by the workers. They neglected to check the liquid level of the tower and did not handle properly when the pump started cavitating. It is unclear why they did not shut it down. Moreover, residual hydrogen in the absorption tower should have been purged with nitrogen before starting the shutdown. The guidelines for shutdown were available but were not followed. This way, the complex shutdown operation depended exclusively on manual actions and on the capacity of personnel to understand the abnormal situation. The management and the plant design could have plaid a role in this.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Steam methane reforming
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
potassion carbonate tank
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The facility was being shut down for regular maintenance.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Property Loss (onsite)

8000000

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary
The tank roof and the upper part of the sidewall were deformed. The explosion damaged also windows of nine buildings, their contents, and 15 vehicles.
Lessons Learned
Complex operations, and especially those of maintenance, which are not executed frequently, should not depends exclusively on the correct performance of workers, without additional safeguards or automatic controls.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
None
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

JST "failures"database: https://www. shippai. org/fkd/en/cfen/CC1200118. html (accessed Dec 2023)

Also H2TOOLS has uploaded from JST https://h2tools. org/lessons/explosion-refinery-hydrogen-production-unit-during-turnaroundshutdown (accessed Sept 2025)