Explosion in a foundry
Coke oven gas was released from a pipeline during maintenance works. The pipeline was supplying the burners of the coke oven with coke oven gas. The original reason for the so-called gas-stop was some maintenance works on the water piping network. This procedure is carried out very seldom because it might damage the oven and takes about 10 h. Therefore, employees decided to do some works on gas pipe network and to execute other cleaning works in the meantime. In particularly, the gasometer used to store coke oven gas had been repaired the previous week. It was decided to perform safety checks just before the "gas stop". It was necessary to see if all the automatic controls were properly functioning. The explosion occurred when subcontractors were replacing a measuring diaphragm by a blind flange on the gas pipeline, which had not been properly purged (or not purged at all). The leak was estimated to release 1Nm3/s and was leaking for 5 to 10 minutes before the explosion. So 300 to 600 Nm3 (125 to 250 kg) of gas was released. The explosion caused the death of 3 subcontractors, 39 injured, among whose 13 seriously burned and material damage.
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments
The INITIATING cause was a release from a gas line when opening a flange. The root cause was the absence of a safety culture. There were no written procedures to inert the gas line. On top of that, there was no coordination between the teams working at different duties on the same unit. Probably there were also design-related contributing causes, considering the difficulty to inert/isolate the lines.
