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Explosion at the cracking unit of a refinery (79)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion at the cracking unit of a refinery

The accident occurred in the hydro-cracking unit, specifically in its sulphur recuperating system. The location was on a 8" piping, which cracked at a a 90° bend. Due to the loss of confinment, a mixture of flammable gases was released from the pipe, which ignited in contact with air and exploded. This was followed by a fire. The released gas was recycled process gas consisting of 80 vol% hydrogen, 14 vol% methane, 1. 8 vol% hydrogen-sulphide , rest C2, C3 and C4 gases and water vapour. A large part of the plant was destroyed. The fire was mainly sustained by the petroleum derived. The smoke cloud was not toxic.
Event Date
June 15, 1992
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was the release and ignition of process gas through a crack in a high-temperature pipe. Other bends in the same piping were not corroded. The pipe had been the object of regular inspection, when its wall thickness was regularly measured: it was found abnormal corrosion. An inadequate inspection can be excluded as root cause. The ROOT CAUSE could be identified in some design shortcoming. It is known that sharp bends in gas pipes operating under harsh pressure and temperature conditions are weak elements, because bending causes microstructural phenomena acting as stress intensifiers of the base pipe metals, and because bends causes additional stresses due to changes in gas flow direction.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Hydrocracking process
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
pipe
Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
2273
Actual Pressure
5
Design Pressure
5
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The operational values were 50 bar at 300°C. The plant was built in 1974. The last shut down for a complete revision was in 1989. During those maintenance works it was changed a curve of the gas recycle system due to its corrosion. Other curves in the same piping were not corroded. In the period between the years 1989 and 1992 the thickness of the tube was regularly measured and never was found an abnormal corrosion
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Property Loss (onsite)

high

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

A large part of the plant was destroyed

Event Nature
Emergency Action
As emergency response to the event, the plant was shut down, electrical supply was cut and loading/unloading operations were stopped. The internal emergency plan operated correctly.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 80% CH4 20%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Flame Type
References
References

Event description in the European database eMARS (accessed December 2020)