Based on the findings and conclusions of the paper of Riziel (see References), the following lessons can be learnt. (1) A risk assessment considering the plant / facility in its entirety is required. The main gas-oil streams flowing from the bottoms of the two HDS strippers operated many years with hydrogen stripping, but a HAZOP (hazard and operability) review study was never performed on the entrance to the storage tanks, the risk assessment had only focussed the stripping tower itself. The question: “Is there any possibility of hydrogen sweeping or solution with the product gas oil?” was never asked. Because of the high diffusivity of hydrogen, its possible presence in the stripped oil stream was not considered relevant. (2) Preventing measures must be based on effective and correct measurements of the critical operative parameters, to detect early enough deviations from their ‘safety’ values. The flash tests were performed on a final product consisting of streams with different boiling points and flash points, some of them with a flash-point temperature below the standard 66 C. However, when arriving in the storage tank at atmospheric pressure, the hydrogen in these streams was leaving the solution and concentrate in the tank vapour space under the roof. A fuel sample taken from the tank to measure the oil flashpoint would not have detected any presence of hydrogen. The detection/analysis of the vapour space under the roof would have delivered the required safety parameter assessment. (3) The definition of the worst-case accidental scenarios is often based on pre-knowledge of the experts, which may exclude some accidental path. The operation of the storage tank could not exclude under all conditions the formation of a flammable/ explosive atmosphere in the gas phase, since air was always present at the top of the tank. An air vent was installed, through which air was sucked into the tank while lowering the oil level and vented out when the level was rising. Therefore, effective preventing measures were adopted to avoid ignition of the fuel. The worker which was extracting the fuel sample wore anti-static clothing and anti-static shoes. However, in presence of hydrogen and a full tank which was minimising the vapour space and facilitating the formation of air-hydrogen mixture above the low flammability limit, the antistatic measures were not enough. The most probable ignition source was an electrostatic charge on the sampling device rope, made of synthetic nylon and not cotton as it should have been. This detail had been disregarded, but had not have any consequence till the moment of the explosion. (4) On the positive side, the fact that the roof was only weakly welded to the walls provided to the explosion an easy path to release energy, without endangering the containment of the oil inside the tank. The full release of the tank content would have had much higher negative consequences and raised the possibility of an escalation.
The tank was in a refined gas and oil product rundown service, and the explosion is believed to have resulted from ignition of a flammable mixture of hydrogen-rich treat gas and air in the vapour space. The vapour space above gas oil (flash point of 66 C), is normally non-flammable. However, at the time of the accident a flammable condition had been generated as a result of non-complete gas-oil stripping at the exit of a hydro treating unit. The IGNITION SOURCE The source of ignition was an electrostatic spark initiated by synthetic rope (instead of a cotton one) used with a device to obtain samples from the tank. The ROOT CAUSE(S) are related to the shortcoming of the risk assessment and of the safety design. Managemnt of changes was not in place, and the preventive systems inadequate for the possible presence of hydrogen in the tank.