Skip to main content

Explosion in a chlorine production plant (777)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Explosion in a chlorine production plant

The event occurred at the chlorine drying towers. The towers, made of PVC, exploded suddenly and violently in a mercury amalgam cell chlorine plant. Because of failure of the electrical power system a circuit breaker tripped out the mercury pumps stopped and the steel bottom plates in the cells became exposed. The alarm did not work since both the AC power supply to the mercury pumps and that for the alarm system were taken from the same source. Meanwhile the DC power and brine supply to the cells were not interrupted. Therefore the hydrogen generated at the steel plate cathode and oxygen at the anode at a mole ratio of 4:1, forming an explosive gas mixture passed to the chlorine drying towers. Concentrated sulphuric acid is used to irrigate the towers for drying of the wet chlorine gas. The most likely source of ignition in the towers was the discharge spark from an electrostatic charge caused by sulphuric acid drip. The actual electrostatic charge of a PVC-made chlorine drying tower was then measured. A static potential of minus 5 kV was constantly detected near the hole which was drilled in the side wall of the space below the Raschig ring layer. The main conclusion, obtained from the studies, is that the towers should be constructed of an acid-proof material in the future, so that the towers can be held at the earth potential together with sulphuric acid to prevent electrostatic charges building up. Three towers were completely destroyed except for the bottom structures which were made of steel. Window glass in the plant was broken within 50 m. One operator was killed and twelve seriously injured. They were all engaged in the repair work on the second tower.
Event Date
July 18, 1975
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
INITIATING cause was power failure with consequent stop of the mercury pumps. But a series of malfunction and non optimal safety design contributed to the final event.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Chlorine production
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
chlorine drying towers
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

All started with a failure of the power system, which activated a circuit breaker

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
12
Number of Fatalities
1
Post-event Summary

Three chlorine drying towers were completely destroyed except for the bottom structures which were made of steel. Window glass in the plant was broken within 50 m.

Lessons Learned
The main conclusion obtained from the referred study is that the towers should be constructed of an acid-proof and conductive material in the future, so that the towers can be held at the earth potential, together with sulphuric acid, to prevent electrostatic charging.
Event Nature
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Y. Tabata et al. Explosion Hazards of Chlorine Drying Towers J. oHarazrdous Materials, 17 (1987) 47-59