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CHH2 tube trailer internal explosion (498)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

CHH2 tube trailer internal explosion

An explosion occurred at a the compressed gas storage facility of a research laboratory, during filling hydrogen cylinders from a hydrogen tube trailer. Workers used a manifold containing residual oxygen, which was also connected to a tube trailer of oxygen. There was only one valve separating the two gases. When attempting to purge oxygen from the manifold using low-pressure hydrogen, the hydrogen-oxygen mixture ignited. The following fire damaged the valve, allowing high-pressure oxygen to flow into the hydrogen tubes of the trailer. The subsequent large mix of oxygen and hydrogen exploded, rupturing some of the tubes and creating a fireball of short duration. The consequence were two injuries and extensive damage to equipment.

Event Date
June 3, 1981
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITATING CAUSE was the failure of the shut-off valve, which allowed oxygen flowing into the hydrogen tube. The IGNITION SOURCE was probably rushing sand particles in the tubing producing sparks. Investigators determined that the fittings for the hydrogen and oxygen delivery systems were similar, allowing the connection of incompatible gases to the same manifold. In addition, workers were not following procedures and did not understand the serious hazards of mixing hydrogen and oxygen. Therefore, ROOT CAUSES were design and installation errors, and a lack of safety standards, training and risk management.

Facility Information
Application
GCH2
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

shutoff valve, tube trailer

Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
3
Design Pressure
3
Location Type
Location description

DESCRIPTION OF THE TRAILER From the photos provided, it appears that the trailer consisted of approximately 36 tubes, containing hydrogen at approximately 38 bar (a surprisingly low value, provided only by one source).

Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The preparation of the transfert process was ongoing

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
2
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

Two workers were severely burned and were absent from work for a total of 4 months. They received first and second-degree burns over about 30% of the bodies. The hydrogen tube trailer experienced major damage, with almost all tubes deformed and/or ruptured. Minor damage was caused to a portion of the facility. Pieces of the tube flew approximately 700 yards away (approx. 640 m).

Event Nature
Emergency Action

unkwon, probably none, due to the velocity of the event

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

Extract from Glass “ Pressure Safety Orientation”, Los Alamos report LA-UR-17-24065, (2017) available at https://www. osti. gov/servlets/purl/1358153 (accessed October 2025)

Jakupca, Hydrogen Systems Risk and Reliability Workshop, University of Maryland, 13 September 2024 UMD HyTERP Hydrogen Risk and Reliability. pdf https://ntrs. nasa. gov/api/citations/20240011501/downloads/UMD%20HyTERP%20Hydrogen%20Risk%20and%20Reliability. pdf (accessed October 2025)

Some quantitative data are provided by a NUREG/CR-3551 https://www. nrc. gov/docs/ML2012/ML20126D044. pdf (accessed October 2025)