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Several leaks from the hoses of a HRS (1196)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Several leaks from the hoses of a HRS

This event summarises 3 very similar cases of leaks at dispenser hoses during refuelling, occurred at the same hydrogen refuelling station in the period January - April 2017. The leaks triggered an automatic or manual shutdown and were also noticed by their hissing sound. In all three cases, the leaks were caused by the degradation occurring at a number of fillings much lower than the one indicated by the hoses manufacturer as a typical lifetime. Despite difference in the detailed mechanism of the degradation, all three cases were characterised by the formation of a crack at the internal surface of the most internal layer of the hoses, followed by crack growth along the pressurisation-depressurisation cycles. In two cases, a stating damage was caused by small spurious particle present in the hydrogen flow. The quantity of hydrogen released were not reported, but were classified as “other than trace amount”.

Event Date
January 19, 2017
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITATING CAUSE was the failure of the internal layer of the hoses The ROOT CAUSE was a shortcoming in the performance of the hoses, and in particularly of the resistance to hydrogen and mechanical fatigues experienced by the most internal layer of the hoses. The damage induced by small metallic particles indicate also shortcoming in the installation phase of the hoses.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
70 MPa HRS
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

hose

Storage/Process Medium
Design Pressure
70
Location Type
Location description

DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY The HRS was a 70MPa refuelling station with a capacity of 34005. 3 m3/day at 82 MPa, with pre--cooled hydrogen delivery.

Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Post-event Summary

in all cases the finacial damage consisted costs of new hoses and the failed delivery of hydrogen to customers.

Lessons Learned

(this is a strongly reduced version of the original KHK report). These hose failures highlighted the need for better materials, better designs and better performance tests. [Fundamental lessons] The hoses failed by internal cracks well before the indicated lifetime by the manufacturers. It appears that the test used during hose development to verify the lifetime of hoses based on the number of "hydrogen impulse testing" was not able to represent real operative conditions at the dispenser. There was the need for hose manufacturers to perform a reality check at the at hydrogen refuelling stations, to identify and understand the degradation mechanisms leading to cracks, and to use the findings to improve the testing methods. [Lessons learned in development] It was also clear that the polymer material used in the innermost layer of the filling hose needed improvement to prevent occurrence of blisters, which could represent the starting point for cracks. Moreover, the overall structure of the reinforcing layer required improvement to better prevent and reduce distortion of the filling hose. Since circumferential strain affects fatigue failure of the innermost layer, it emerged the need to reduce this strain by increasing the braid angle of the special high-strength fibre in the reinforcing layer. However, care must be taken to avoid reducing pressure resistance and durability of the filling hose, so that an additional steel wire reinforcing layer could be required. [Lessons learned when installing and replacing hoses] Filling hoses through which low-temperature, high-pressure hydrogen passes can develop cracks due to the impact of small amounts of metal powder remaining in the flow path, and the subsequent cycle of pressurization and depressurisation can cause the cracks to grow and penetrate the hose. When installing or replacing a filling hose, it is important to take care to prevent metal powder from remaining in the flow path, such as by purging the flow path with nitrogen.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

The safety systems in place worked as designed with no consequence to human or installation. In one case, the first detection of the leak did not occurred atuomatically, by the alarm of the dispenser detector, but happened by hearing a hissing sound.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

KHK accidentl database, incident 2017-037: https://www. khk. or. jp/public_information/incident_investigation/hpg_incident/gen_lp. html (accessed august 2024)

English translated version (by Google)