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Leak at the generator of a nuclear power plant (792)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Leak at the generator of a nuclear power plant

A leak started on the hydrogen coolant cicrcuit of one of the power generators of the plant. It was indirectly detected because f the increased need to generate new hydrogen for cooling and it kept growing in the following days. After attempts to isolate the leak, the opetator decidedto shutdown theturbine-generator unit and replaced all the hydrogen coolers. This is a more detailed sequence of events: 28 August - First signal of an increased make-up rate of hydrogen cooling gas to the main generator. The normal make-up rate of hydrogen was approximately 600 standard cubic feet per day (SCFD). This increase was an indication of hydrogen losses due to a leak. Technicians sampled areas of the turbine building confirming absence of an explosive mixture. They verified through periodic tours of the turbine building that no welding, cutting, or grinding was being conducted that could result in an ignition source for any potential hydrogen concentration build-up in the turbine building. 10 September - Make-up rate of hydrogen increased to approximately 4,000 SCFD by September 10, 2002. The operator tried unsuccessfully to isolate the hydrogen cooler suspected to leak. 11 September - After unsuccessful attempts to isolate the hydrogen leak, the operator decided to take the unit off-line to implement a repair. , The power was reduced to approximately 10% and the generator was taken off-line. 13 September - All four generator hydrogen coolers were replaced, and the unit was restored to full power operations.

Event Date
August 28, 2002
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Nuclear power plant, PWR
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

hydrogen cooler

Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description

The nuclear power plant consisted in two four-loop Westinghouse pressurized water reactors . • Units 2 was completed in 1974 with capacity of 1,032 MWe. • Units 3 was completed in 1976, with a of 1,051 MWe. DESCRIPTION OF THE GENERATOR COOLING SYSTEM In a typical H2 coolant system, the hydrogen circulates in a loop between the generators and the coolers, which function are heat exchangers which bring the temperature of the hot hydrogen exiting the generator loop back to near room temperature. Due to unavoidable hydrogen minor losses, the hydrogen in the circuit has to be topped up by make-up hydrogen, which can be produced onsite and/or supplied by an onsite storage system o be regularly replaced via delivery. The NRC report does not specify which make-up system was present in this plant. The daily need for make-up hydrogen was approximately 1. 5 kg. During the reported event, the daily losses were amounting at almost one order of magnitude more (10 kg/d). A New York Times news was reporting a value of 25 kg/d. The fact that all four were replaced induce to conclude that the loss of hydrogen was occurring there.

Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Property Loss (onsite)

low

Property Loss (offsite)

0

Post-event Summary

The damage was limited to the loss of electricity production suring few days, and the reapclements of 4 hydrogen coolers.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

The operator regularly monitored the evolution of the hydrogen concentration in the turbine hall, to ensure that the value was remaining below the safe flammability threshold, and eventually replaced all hydrogen cooling systems, because unable to locate and isolate the leak.

Emergency Evaluation

A nuclear authority performed an inspection of the plant after the notification of the incident. The inspection scope covered the fire protection measures, the training of personnel, the maintenances procedures, the risk assessment and the foreseen emergency actions. The findings were all positive and no corrective action was issued.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

NRC report on inspection of 28 September 2008 https://www. nrc. gov/docs/ML0231/ML023100502. pdf (accessed Devember 2025)