Hydrogen explosion at renewable hydrogen production facility
The hydrogen buffer tanks that exploded were part of an experimental facility experimenting generation of renewable hydrogen from a water electrolyser coupled to solar panels. The three hydrogen tanks (40 m3 capacity each at pressures of 1,2 MPa one of them and 0,7 MPa the two others) were receiving the hydrogen produced by the electrolyser. Firefighters said all three tanks were destroyed in the explosion; there was no fire, but the explosion was strong enough to send debris being scattered in an area well over 3,000 square meters. "It's not known whether three tanks exploded at the same time or whether it was a series of explosions". The equivalent TNT is estimated to be of about 50 Kg based on the damage near by. There was no secondary fire and the damage is merely by the detonation pressure. The explosion killed two people, injured six others, and caused damage to a nearby ceramic components manufacturing plant. The buildings within 100 m from the tanks were heavy damaged. People in the city at 6-7 km from the site heard the explosion.
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
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Cause Comments
According to the preliminary results of the legal investigation (still ongoing, October 2020) and no final report about the causes is yet available (in Korean, translated into English by a non-official translator), the hydrogen and buffer tanks exploded due to a static spark in the hydrogen buffer tank, with oxygen concentration exceeding 6%, which is explosion threshold. The presence of oxygen in the hydrogen stream was due to a wrong operation of the water electrolyser, which had been operated at a power lower than the minimal power level. Due to the asbestos type of separation membrane adopted in the electrolyser, the system has to be operated above the 98 kWh threshold, which corresponded to 50% of the nominal power. On the contrary, due to characteristics of the solar panels providing the power, the system often had often operated at a power lower than this threshold. The investigation has also identified a series of contributing causes: (1) The option to use an oxygen removing component was not considered in the final design, as well las the static spark remover in the hydrogen buffer tank. These decisions were probably related to the need to reduce costs. (2) Oxygen concentrations were detected higher than 3%, but it was decided to continue operation because to achieve the 1000 hours of operation necessary to validate the tests. (3) The safety management team did not followed the safety requirement to daily test the hydrogen quality.
