Skip to main content

Fire at a hydrotreater of a refinery (977)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire at a hydrotreater of a refinery

This incident occurred at a unit designed to convert heavy oil residues into refined products. It involved a fluidized bed reactor and the related hydrogen supply system serving the optimisation of the catalytic conversion insider the reactor. Note: there are two versions of the events. eMARS and MARSH (see references). They agree in identifying triggering event the trip of a hydrogen compressor. They diverge however about the following steps and their causes. The version presented here is the one provided by the European eMARS database, because based on the results of an investigation. The accident was probably triggered by a mechanical failure of regulation of a secondary supply line from the compressor which was providing the reactor with hydrogen. The supply line providing the reactor with hydrogen gas was at 160 bar and 500 °C. The rupture caused a hydrogen leak, which ignited and formed a horizontal jet fire. The flame was located at an elevation of about 8 m from ground level that affected other components and equipment. The rupture occurred close to a valve in the hydrogen pipe with clamp connectors, in the vicinity of the reactors. The causes of the rupture were identified as being the result of anomalous operation of the facility due to reduced/non-existent hydrogen flow that led to cooling by natural convection and consequent thermal stress. The loss of flow in the pipe occurred because of a compressor becoming blocked and a second compressor reducing to minimal flow. The fire then caused some other components in the facility to rupture, leading to a partial release of hydrocarbons. This was also the result of the malfunctioning of a cut-off valve when operated manually, probably because of a power cut owing to the power supply panel being affected by the fire. There was also a fire near the air coolers that broke out when the facility was depressurised rapidly because of stresses in excess of those designed for. The quantities involved were 70 t of hydrocarbon and 0. 3 t of hydrogen.

Event Date
December 1, 2016
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIATING/direct cause was a mechanical failure, which caused a series of additional failures. Two sources diverge on the exact reasons of these failures, but are bot pointing at the same type of causes. Human errors and procedures and management shortcoming are the root cause, because procedures had not been followed and incorrect mitigating operations were undertaking on a series of failing components.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
hydrogen compression
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

hydrogen compressor, flidised bed reactor

Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
300
Actual Pressure
16
Location Type
Location description

DESCRIPTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL PROCESS The hydrocracker was a prototype, aiming at refining crude oil rest. It was of the type 'ebullated bed reactor' , i. e. a type of fluidized bed reactor that utilizes ebullition, or bubbling, to achieve appropriate distribution of reactants and catalysts. Hydrogen and feedstock enter at the bottom of the reactor, thereby expanding the catalyst bed.

Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The hydrogen supply line was at 160 bar and 500 °C.

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

4000000

Post-event Summary

The facility suffered such major damage that it had to be rebuilt. According to another source, the 325 M$ of 2016 can be converted into 401M$ of 2021. There is no record of the event having consequences for human health, the environment or non-company property. The data recorded by the air quality monitoring network did not reveal significant increases in the concentration of the pollutants measured.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

At 3:40 p. m. a worker on the spot noticed a leak in the structure behind the reactor and reported it to the control room. The operational staff who went to the location found white smoke leaking from the hydrogen supply line followed by the outbreak of a fire with a light-coloured, horizontal flame. The alarm was raised and the order given for the unit to be rapidly depressurised and cut off. The firefighting team attended an air cooler where a fire was clearly breaking out and in the vicinity of the reactor using the necessary firefighting vehicles and equipment to contain the incipient fire and cool the surrounding metal structures. The local fire brigade was called at 4:05 p. m. once it had become clear how serious the situation was. When the firefighters arrived, they continued the containment and cooling activities with the help of refinery personnel. Operations continued through the night until 7:50 a. m. on 2 December, with cooling and control activities going on until the afternoon of 2 December. As per the IEP, the local authorities were kept constantly abreast of how the accident was developing, both by the company and by fire brigade representatives present on site. Based on how the situation developed, the local authorities did not deem it necessary to trigger the External Emergency Plan (EEP).

Release Type
Release Substance
H2, hydrocarbons
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

Event description in the European database eMARS https://emars. jrc. ec. europa. eu/en/emars/accident/view/0b8a7a30-41d5-ba1a-ab3c-abf07ebd1bc2 (accessed December 2023)

MARSH report, 100 largest losses in the hydrocarbon industry, 27th edition 2022 https://www. marsh. com/cz/en/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-largest-losses. html (accessed January 2024)

prima PAVIA News of 15 September https://primapavia. it/cronaca/incendio-raffineria-eni-due-dirigenti-condannati-uno-assolto/ (accessed January 2024)