Fire in the hydrogen washing tower of a chlorine plant
An explosion occurred inside the hydrogen washing tower of a chlorine production plant. The explosion was preceded by an abrupt reduction in the electrolysis flow due to a rectifier malfunction. The fact that the electrolyser was working at low power caused a significant increase in the oxygen level in the hydrogen gas. For the temperature prevailing in the cubicle, the hydrogen gas contained an excessive amount of diluting water vapour which, however, was absent in the top section of the washing tower, allowing for teh production of flammable oxygen-hydrogen mixture . The explosive gas ignited and broke the rupture diaphragm. The discharged hydrogen ignited, causing a minor leakage of hydrochloric acid in the hydrochloric acid top container above it and the related pipes. The electrolysis flow in the unit was cut off with the emergency shut-off switch two minutes after the explosion, at which point nitrogen flushing to dilute the gas was also started. Burning hydrogen gas was discharged from the rupture disc opening until the connection to the main hydrogen pipe was closed.
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was the explosion in the washing tower, with escalation outside it due to the opening of the burst discs and the release of ignited hydrogen. The report attributed the reason for the formation of a flammable mixture to an increased oxygen flow into the hydrogen flow due to operation of the electrolyser at low power. However, this was a chlorine production plant, based on brine electrolyser, with salt (NaOH) as feedstock and chlorine and sodium hydroxide as commercial products and hydrogen as by-product. It is easier to assume that the explosion was due to a hydrogen-chlorine mixture. The report used as a source is unclear on this point, but this lack of clarity does not impede to propose a root cause. The incident is characterised by a lack of safety measures able to avoid escalation up to explosion. Detector in the output flows are used to monitor composition of the products and trigger alarm and automatic actions in case of trespassing of safety maximum values. Moreover, interlocks should have been able to avoid operation of the electrolysers outside the allowed operative ranges. Therefore, the ROOTCAUSE could be identified by two factors: inadequate safety design and lack or good risk assessment by the management.
