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Fire in the hydrogen washing tower of a chlorine plant (347)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire in the hydrogen washing tower of a chlorine plant

An explosion occurred inside the hydrogen washing tower of a chlorine production plant. The explosion was preceded by an abrupt reduction in the electrolysis flow due to a rectifier malfunction. The fact that the electrolyser was working at low power caused a significant increase in the oxygen level in the hydrogen gas. For the temperature prevailing in the cubicle, the hydrogen gas contained an excessive amount of diluting water vapour which, however, was absent in the top section of the washing tower, allowing for teh production of flammable oxygen-hydrogen mixture . The explosive gas ignited and broke the rupture diaphragm. The discharged hydrogen ignited, causing a minor leakage of hydrochloric acid in the hydrochloric acid top container above it and the related pipes. The electrolysis flow in the unit was cut off with the emergency shut-off switch two minutes after the explosion, at which point nitrogen flushing to dilute the gas was also started. Burning hydrogen gas was discharged from the rupture disc opening until the connection to the main hydrogen pipe was closed.
Event Date
July 17, 2002
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING CAUSE was the explosion in the washing tower, with escalation outside it due to the opening of the burst discs and the release of ignited hydrogen. The report attributed the reason for the formation of a flammable mixture to an increased oxygen flow into the hydrogen flow due to operation of the electrolyser at low power. However, this was a chlorine production plant, based on brine electrolyser, with salt (NaOH) as feedstock and chlorine and sodium hydroxide as commercial products and hydrogen as by-product. It is easier to assume that the explosion was due to a hydrogen-chlorine mixture. The report used as a source is unclear on this point, but this lack of clarity does not impede to propose a root cause. The incident is characterised by a lack of safety measures able to avoid escalation up to explosion. Detector in the output flows are used to monitor composition of the products and trigger alarm and automatic actions in case of trespassing of safety maximum values. Moreover, interlocks should have been able to avoid operation of the electrolysers outside the allowed operative ranges. Therefore, the ROOTCAUSE could be identified by two factors: inadequate safety design and lack or good risk assessment by the management.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Chlorine production
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
rupture diaphragms, hydrogen washing tower
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS A hydrogen washing tower in a chlorine production plant is a piece of equipment used to cool, dehumidify, and clean the hydrogen gas produced during the electrolysis of brine, ensuring high purity and safety before it is used or stored. This tower circulates an alkaline, water-based solution to remove moisture and other impurities like chlorine from the hydrogen stream.
Operational Condition
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Currency
Property Loss (onsite)

50000

Event Nature
Emergency Action
Burning hydrogen gas was discharged from the rupture disc opening until the connection to the main hydrogen pipe was closed.
Release Type
Release Substance
H2 100%
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
References
References

Source lost