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Fire at a generator of a power plant (42)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire at a generator of a power plant

The incident started with the cracking of the low-pressure turbine blades. This caused an unbalance to turbine generator rotor which led to the failure of the bearings and the loss of confinement of the hydrogen used as a coolant, which ignited. Also the oil pipes connected to the turbine generator were teared open due to the vibrations. The fire spread to cable trays in the turbine building and control equipment room, which triggered a total loss of power supply which lasted for 17 hours. The secondary cooling system of the reactor was stopped until operators started up the diesel-driven fire pumps in order to feed the steam generators with fire water. There were no injuries, no damage to the nuclear reactor, and no spread of radioactivity.

Event Date
March 31, 1993
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

INITIATING CAUSES The failure of the low-pressure turbine started the series of events. The initial event was the breaking of some turbine blades. ROOT CAUSE The fire could spread up to the control equipment room due to lack of measures for fire propagation and escalation: (i) lack of proper fire-retarding provisions, (ii) inadequacy in fire-barriers, and (iii) insufficient physical separation in redundant safety.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Nuclear power plant
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

turbine, collant system, cables, control room

Storage/Process Medium
Actual Pressure
0
Design Pressure
0
Location Type
Location description

DESCRIPTION of the FACILITY The nuclear power plant was a pressurised water reactor, consisting of a twin - unit of 220 Mwe each. It had been commissioned in the year 1989 and 1992 respectively.

Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The release of hydrogen was preceded by the failure of the low-pressure turbine.

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Environmental Damage
0
Lessons Learned

The most risk-significant auxiliary systems are, in a decreasing order: (1) Turbine-generator lubricant oil systems, (2) Hydrogen cooling system, (3) Pump lubricant oil, (4) The electrical components (cables, motors etc. ) The relative importance of the fire consequences is based on the masses involved, which generate very different fire loads. Therefore a hydrogen fire load is much less that the one from oil, however the possibility of explosion raises the attention to be given to the hydrogen system. In this incident, apparently, hydrogen ignited first, assisting or triggering the oil fire.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

The reactor was immediately shut-down and could be maintained in a safe shut-down state with adequate sub-criticality at all stages. Crash cool down of the primary heat transport system was done and subsequently fire fighting water was injected into the steam generators for maintaining thermosiphon cooling of the core.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2, lubricant oil
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

N. K. Agarwal, UPGRADING OF FIRE SAFETY IN INDIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, in "Upgrading of fire safety in nuclear power plants", IAEA-TECDOC-1014, Proceedings of an International Symposium, Vienna (Austria), 18-21 November 1997 https://www. iaea. org/publications/5310/upgrading-of-fire-safety-in-nuclear-power-plants (accessed July 2024)