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Fire at a flare stack of a chemical plant (931)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire at a flare stack of a chemical plant

A fire developed at the top of the flare stack of a during a violent thunderstorm, in a chemical plant (Seveso-classified). The flare stack is used to discharge hydrogen produced by the restarting of chlorine electrolysis cells. The fire was ignited despite steam and nitrogen had specifically were injected to prevent it from occurring. The site’s firefighters cooled the flare stack while the technicians turned off the electrolysis cells to cut off the hydrogen feeding the flames. The electrolysis cells had been restarted following a power outage that had occurred earlier, at the start of the storm. The fire was extinguished after approximately 3 hours, and the electrolysis unit was restarted.
Event Date
July 29, 2013
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments
INITIATING CAUSE was the lightning bolt which released enough energy to ignite the hydrogen reach mixture out of the flare stack.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Chlorine production
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
flare stack, electrolyser cells
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
A bnormal weather conditions: a thunderstorm had caused a power outage and the stopping of the electrolysis cells one hour before the incident.
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Lessons Learned
The same event occurred already five years earlier. At that time, corrective measures had been adopted, among which the dilution of the hydrogen flow, to reduce the probability of ignition. However, this measure did not altogether eliminate the risk of ignition, because the hydrogen remained above the minimum ignition concentration, as demonstrated by the fact that a lightning was sufficient to start a fire. The report does not mention the lesson learnt in this second event. One obvious follow-up action would be the extension of the measures against consequences of lightning to the whole year. Another action would aim at improving them. The assessment of the hydrogen concentrations in and at the exit of the flare stack and consequently performing a risk assessment to ascertain the need for modification of the venting conditions, including the steam/nitrogen dilution process. (See also HIAD_797, a 3rd incident caused by lightning).
Event Nature
Emergency Action
1:20 Power outage and restart of the electrolyser 2:45 Lightning bolt ignited the hydrogen at the top of he flare stack 3:10 The site’s firefighters started cooling the flare stack. 4:57 The fire was extinguished5:10 the Electrolyser was restarted
Release Type
Release Substance
H2, steam, N2
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Flame Type
References
References

Event description in the French database ARIA https://www. aria. developpement-durable. gouv. fr/accident/44133/ (accessed September 2020)

News of the 29 July 2013 on the site of the the Platform Chimique du Pont de Claix http://www. plateformechimiquedupontdeclaix. com/feu-sur-une-cheminee-de-la-plate-forme-chimique-du-pont-de-claix/