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Fire from a flange of a desulphurisation unit (1201)

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire from a flange of a desulphurisation unit

During startup of the hydrodesulphurisation unit, diesel and hydrogen leaked from a flange near the heat exchanger. The flammable mixture ignited spontaneously, causing a fire. Plant personnel detected the fire. The unit was immediately shut down and depressurised, by releasing the gaseous content (hydrogen) content to the flair. Nitrogen was introduced into the unit and the diesel recovered. Ten hours later the fire was declared definitively extinguished. A post-accident inspection determined that the source of the fire was likely near the 90° side of the flange, based on discoloration of the equipment surrounding the heat exchanger and damage to the gasket. The reason of the leak was attributed to plastic deformation of the flange gasket due to infiltration of rainwater, which cooled and shrunk the flange bolts. The present of rainwater was due to a weather hood only temporarily fastened.

Event Date
June 21, 2018
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments

The INITIATING CAUSE was the loss of tightness of a flange due to damage of its O-ring. Based on these findings, it is estimated that the leak occurred through the following mechanism, causing the 349°C internal fluid (diesel and hydrogen) to spontaneously ignite. (1) The weather hood was attached to the flange, covering the upper two-thirds of its circumference. It was temporarily fastened during startup and was scheduled to be fully fastened after steady-state operation. (2) It had continued to rain from the morning of the day before the accident until dawn on the day of the accident. (3) Due to the temporary character of the fastening, multiple gaps opened between the weather hood and the flange, allowing rainwater to penetrate through these gaps. (4) The infiltrating rainwater splashed onto the flange bolts, cooling them. (5) The cooled bolts contracted, causing an imbalance in the flange's surface pressure, resulting in plastic deformation of the gasket (a 0. 1 mm dent). (6) When the rain stopped, the bolts stretched due to the temperature rise, creating a gap between the recess in the gasket and the flange, which caused the internal fluid to leak. ROOT CAUSE The post-accident investigation did not find corrosion or damage to the heat exchanger flange or bolts. Moreover, the bolts were tightened to the specified axial force, confirming that there were no problems with construction management or application of procedures. Indeed, the tightening procedure aimed at preventing uneven flange surface pressure by carefully managing the axial force of the bolts. There was, however, no procedure for managing the weather hood installation, and the weather hood was temporarily fastened at startup. This lack of a specific procedure could be interpreted as a ROOT CAUSE, worsened by harsh environmental conditions.

Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Hydrodesulphurisation process
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved

vlve, O-ring

Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description

DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY The overall plant is not provided. It is probably a refinery. The data provided for the gas (hydrogen?) production facility consist of two production flows: 242,154 x 103 m3/day (Business) 7,195 x 103 m3/day (Facility) It is unclear what these flows consist of.

Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary

The plant was re-starting.

Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
0
Number of Fatalities
0
Property Loss (onsite)

0

Lessons Learned

This incident consisted in a loss of confinement due to unexpected thermal expansion difference acting on a flange and its O-ring. It is important to fully understand the importance of axial force management for high-temperature flanges, which experience significant temperature increases during startups and shutdowns. It is equally important to put in place carefully all foreseen measures to avoid additional temperature-induced stresses, in particularly understanding the role of weather hoods. It is important to specify the above points and appropriate construction methods in the construction guidelines and procedures and to educate workers accordingly.

Event Nature
Emergency Action

The is the chronological summary of the incident: June 12: The startup of the hydrodesulfurization unit began June 21: 7:13 AM, Plant personnel detect a fire near the heat exchanger of the unit. 7:18 AM, the unit emergency shut down was executed. 7:23 AM, the depressurisation from the reactor to the flare began. 9:17 AM, the gas concentration near the heat exchanger was confirmed to be 0 ppm. 10:34 AM, nitrogen was introduced into the unit. 12:31 PM, the recycle gas system was pressurised to 1. 0 MPa using nitrogen, and oil recovery by liquid draining within the recycle gas system began. 3:17 PM, the oil recovery was completed. 5:25 PM, the fire was confirmed to have been extinguished.

Release Type
Release Substance
H2 diesel
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
0.00
Ignition Source
References
References

KHK accidentl database, incident 2018-207: https://www. khk. or. jp/public_information/incident_investigation/hpg_incident/gen_lp. html (accessed august 2024)

English translated version (by Google)