Fire at the desulphurisation unit of a refinery
The incident occurred at the direct desulfurization unit of heavy oil. A 130×90 mm oval opening occurred in the bypass pipe of the hydrogen sulphide absorption tower for the circulating gas, at a height of about 20 m from ground. The process fluid, consisting mainly of hydrogen, leaked and ignited, causing a fire. The fire broke out in combination with an explosive noise. It burned a part of the system installed in the site in a range of the radius of about 30 m, and was extinguished after about 10 hours. The heavy oil supply was stopped, waiting for the complete burning-off of the hydrogen and the heavy oil of about 1,000 kl left in the system. The fire station dispatched 27 fire engines for chemical fire, fighting the fire by pouring nitrogen in the piping system. The fire was extinguished 10 hours later. The bypass piping was made ofSTS48-S steel, had a nominal diameter of 10 inches, and a wall thickness of 28. 6 mm. The failure occurred at a dead-end branch of the pipe, positioned vertically, which upon inspection resulted extremely corroded and thinned. The cause was supposed to be the consequence of rapid corrosion due to accidental formation of ammonium (hydro)-sulphide from nitrogen, hydrogen and hydrogen sulphide, in presence of condensed water. The operative condition of that part of the pipe were almost stagnation due to absence of flow, temperature variation and humidity variation with consequent cycling condensation/evaporation.
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The INITIATING cause was the corrosion of the pipe due to accidental formation of corrosive substances from hydrogen, hydrogen sulphide and nitrogen impurities. The ROOT CAUSE was the lack of effective inspection and of operative feedback which should have contribute to improve the design.
