fire from a de-sulphurisation unit
The incident occurred at the residual de-sulphurisation (RDS) unit of a refinery, during the initial start-up phase, consisting of the pressurisation by hydrogen of the unit reactors and the downstream coolers. The incident led to significant damages to the downstream coolers and some part of the reactors. The cause of the leak was a rupture in the rectangular header box of the reactor effluent air cooler, placed downstream of the RDS reactors. The rupture led to a large hydrogen leak that spontaneously ignited with very small delay ignition time (<3s), and created a fireball with a size of around 83 m and very small overpressure. According to the investigation calculation, the hydrogen fire terminated within less than 10 minutes after ignition. However, due flame impinging on other components, a domino effect followed with the release and ignition of fuels from fuel pipes ruptures. The fire was extinguished by shutting off the waste gas into the flare system. DETAILED TIMELINE of the INCIDENT The residual de-sulphurisation (RDS) unit was under routine maintenance before the incident. All hydrogen had been purged and replaced by nitrogen. October 13, the unit was ready for pressurization and drying of catalyst by nitrogen. October 20, the drying was completed, the temperature was reduced to 160 °C and hydrogen was fed into the system to replace nitrogen. October 23 17:15, when the system pressure had reached 5. 5 MPa and hydrogen concentration was above 88%, a small leak was found on one of the plug in head box outlet. The leak could not be sealed by tightening and thus the system was depressurised and hydrogen replaced again by nitrogen. October 25 The plug leak was sealed by welding on and the pressurisation resumed. October 27 19:50, the pressure reached 12. 35 MPa and hydrogen concentration was above 88%. Pressurization continued and by 22:34 a large fire occurred near the REACs area.

The INITIAL CAUSE of the rupture of the header was corrosion by sulphide stress cracking. The metallographic investigation found also considerable welding defects. The ROOT CAUSE was a lack of regular and effective inspection. Moreover, the air-coolers used in this de-sulphurisation unit are characterised by specific risks related to the absence of a shell. A loss of confinement from the tube will cause a direct release into air. To mitigate the associated risks, a specific risk assessment is required, which seems having been incomplete in this case. CONTRIBUTING CAUSES to the domino effect was the absence of sprinklers and of measures aiming at protecting from fire the individual components.