Explosion at the storage unit of a power plant
A hydrogen explosion occurred at the hydrogen storage unit of a power generation plant. A burst disc opened, releasing approximately 3 tons of hydrogen. The leaked hydrogen formed an explosive mixture of hydrogen and air before igniting. A fire followed the explosion, fed by the hydrogen which continued to escape from the storage tubes. Internal and external fire-fighting teams intervened by cooling the hydrogen tubes and adjacent gas storage cylinders. The fire burned out approximately 2 hours and 20 minutes. Damage was limited to area nearby the leak, breaking the wall adjacent to the hydrogen storage assembly. A worker passing nearby was jarred but not knocked down. The investigation revealed that: (i) The disc failed at a hydrogen pressure (14. 5 MPa, 2100 psi) below its rated pressure ( 24. 1 MPa, 3500 psi). The cause of the premature disc failure was damage from the atmosphere side, due to formation of ice. Water had accessed the disc vent pipe because it was not equipped with cap for weather protection. (ii) The force of the release separated the disc from its vent pipe. Therefore the internal pressure caused the pipe to detach, increasing the probability of combustible mixture formation and ignition. (iii) If the contract would have properly installed and maintained the equipment, this incident would have been prevented. Even in case of a premature rupture of the burst disc, the hydrogen would have very probably been vented via the disc vent pipe, without ignition.

The INITIATING CAUSE was the degradation and failure of a burst disc due to adverse weather condition (formation of ice), which have to be considered a CONTRIBUTING CAUSE. ROOT CAUSE According to the investigation, the explosion was the consequence of deficiencies in components of the hydrogen storage assembly, installed and maintained by a contractor. The deficiencies were partially of a design nature (vent pipe weakly fixed to the frame, one was bent 90 degree), partially by bad inspection and maintenance (missing weather protection cap and damage in vent). In addition, the plant operator, relied completely on the contractor of the installation safety, and did not consider the necessity to supervise contractor’s compliance with the safety rules and standards.