Explosion at a filling hose of a hydrogen dispenser
The incident occurred at a dispenser of a hydrogen refuelling station (HRS). The HRS employee had just terminated the filling of a fuel cell vehicle (FHV) and was depressurising the filling hose, when a gas detector near the filling nozzle detected a leak and issued a visual alarm. However, the employee was in the blind spot of the alarm light and did not notice it. After depressurising the filling hose, the employee removed the filling nozzle from the FCV and stored it in the dispenser. The filling hose exploded with an explosive sound, breaking open the thermoplastic resin outer layer of the filling hose. No personal injury occurred. The following is a chronological summary of the accident: • 3:45 PM - The FCV arrived at the HRS. • 3:48 PM - The FCV began filling with hydrogen. • 15:52, the hydrogen filling into the FCV was terminated. While the filling hose was being depressurized, the suction-type gas detector near the filling nozzle triggered an alarm at 500 ppm of hydrogen. One second later, a high alarm at 1,000 ppm was triggered and the hydrogen compressor automatically shut down. • The employee was in the blind spot of the rotating beacon (patrol light) installed near the dispenser, so they did not notice the alarm. • After depressurisation of the filling hose, when the employee removed the filling nozzle from the FCV receptacle and placed it back into the dispenser, a loud pop was heard and the filling hose ruptured, scattering the thermoplastic resin outer layer of the filling hose.

INITIATING CAUSE The inner layer of the filling hose failed due to material fatigue under harsh operative conditions: ultra-low temperatures of approximately -40°C) and repeated pressurisation and decompression cycles from 0 MPa to 82 MPa. The investigation revealed that a small hole developed in the innermost layer (resin, approximately 1 mm thick) near the nozzle end of the filling hose. The hydrogen leaked then through the hole into the reinforcing layer, forming a gas reservoir between the innermost and outer layers along the entire length of the hose (3,500 mm). When the filling hose was removed from the vehicle's receptacle and returned to the dispenser, the outer layer ruptured, causing the hydrogen to scatter. ROOT CAUSE(s) This filling hose was an older model, a prototype for demonstration testing, and was not as durable as the new model with an improved innermost layer of material and a longer lifetime. The manufacturer's warranty period for this filling hose was one year after the start of the operation or 500 pressurisations, whatever came first. However, because it had only been pressurised 330 times, it was used for a period exceeding the manufacturer's warranty (one year and four months). This use a component beyond its guaranteed lifetime was a management decision. An additional element of the root cause was also the loose relationship between the simplified tests executed to assess/verify hose performance and the real (harsher) operative conditions. Finally, the failing to realise that an alarm had been triggered and that the dispenser had been shutdown is an indication that the design of an emergency situation needed improvement.