Explosion and fire of coke gas in a steel production plant
An explosion followed by a fire occurred at a tar precipitator of gas treatment of a coke oven. The extractors were manually activated. Ten minutes later, the operator activates the internal emergency plan. The fuel supply to the installation was interrupted. Approximately two hours later the fire was extinguished by nitrogen purging. The operator estimated the maximum amount of material that reacted in the explosion of the tar precipitator at 170 kg in TNT equivalent. In total, the operator estimated that 36,790 t of coke oven gas were released and burned at the candles (torches above the oven batteries) and flares. The coke oven gas consisted mainly of hydrogen and methane. A crack had been identified in the steam circuit eight months before the accident, which could not be repaired without a precipitator shutdown. As the monitoring of the oxygen measurement at the precipitator outlet did not show any deviation, the repair was scheduled for the normal shutdown 3 days after the day of the accident. Several hypotheses as to the origin of the ignition energy were put forward: electrostatic due to the friction of the air/gas mixture (also composed of dust) on the metal plates, chemical due to the presence of pyrophoric materials or mechanical due to the fall of a metal part inside the precipitator. [ARIA event 56415]
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments
The decision to continue operation after the detection of a crack in the steam circuit can be considered the root cause of this incident. The third-party expert report concluded that the most probable hypothesis was that the mixture of coke oven gases came into contact with the oxygen in the air coming from the leakage of the steam network, and ignited by the electrostatic energy generated by the friction of the gases on the metal walls. The explosion of an electrostatic tar precipitator had already occurred on this site in July 2005 and on other sites of the group abroad in November 2017 and in 2019. However, explosions have always occurred during the restarting of the precipitator by powering the electric fields, never during the washing and draining phases when the electric fields are not powered (no source of ignition). There was therefore no feedback and this risk had not been identified by the operator.
