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Exposure between these products is bidirectional. A hazard analysis should consider what happens to
alternate fueling equipment if an incident with one of the fuels occurs. Care must be taken to have the
appropriate separation distance and mitigations according to the applicable codes. Limited experience
with existing stations has shown that these multi-fuel stations can be successful…
There are numerous models that can be used to assess the consequence and risk of leaks and releases.
One such model is HYRAM which is publicly available from Sandia and the US DOE.
Emergency response procedures must be developed for each system based on its design. The
procedures generally include steps to clear personnel from the immediate area, isolate the hydrogen,
shut down the equipment, contact local responders, and protect surrounding equipment/structures until
the hazard is mitigated or the incident is over.
Each installation should be evaluated based on the results of a hazard analysis considering both of these
scenarios. Separation distances as listed in documents such as NFPA 2, Hydrogen Technologies Code, are
a minimum starting point but may need to be adjusted based on analysis. Recent work by NFPA 2 has
also included overpressure criteria, but the consequences can vary depending on…
Documents such as NFPA 2, Hydrogen Technologies Code, and the International Fire Code have quantity thresholds that differentiate requirements for the design of systems and enclosures. However, even the smaller quantities present a hazard under specific conditions, especially for systems that have the potential to release hydrogen into a confined or unvented space. Good engineering judgement…
No, this is not a common or preferred approach. Isolating the source of hydrogen is the best safety practice. Water systems could extinguish the flame but allow the gas to continue leaking and result in an explosion if reignited.
Situations where extinguishing a hydrogen leak prior to stopping flow is safer are rare. Hydrogen releases have a high potential for inadvertent re-ignition and subsequent explosion. Some vent stacks might be equipped with an extinguishing system, but these often can be more hazardous than allowing a properly designed vent stack to continue to burn until the source is isolated.
Releases from high pressure hydrogen systems often make a sound. In those cases, sound might be the
easiest way for a person to know there is a hazard. However, leaks can be relatively small and diffuse,
thereby not making much sound, or alternately large and so loud that they can be very difficult to find. In
both cases, it can be hazardous to move into or through an area.
Dispersion and radiation analysis should be conducted to ensure that the hydrogen cloud will not interfere with the flight path of aircraft. In addition, there may be maximum height requirements due to airport requirements depending on the location of the stack.
Guidance for location of vent stacks is provided by NFPA 2, Hydrogen Technologies Code, which also references CGA G5.5, Hydrogen Vent Systems, for additional guidance. Minimum distances to vent stack outlets should be determined from dispersion and radiation analyses. The height of the vent stack and orientation of the release will affect the minimum separation distance.
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